Lecture 4
The Asymmetry of Causation

1. Introduction
One puzzle in the metaphysics of causation concerns its time-asymmetry. That is, its tendency to ‘move’ from past to future. The tendency for causes to be in the past relative to their effects.

‘Third arrow’ strategies. Time and causation are similarly oriented because their orientation is explained by a third asymmetry.

2. The Arrow of Counterfactual Dependence
Lewis argues that the time-asymmetry of causation arises from the contingent asymmetry of counterfactual dependence.

Similarity Conditions for the Ranking of Worlds

(I) Avoid big, widespread, diverse violations of law.

(II) Maximize the spatio-temporal region throughout which perfect match of particular fact prevails.

(III) Avoid even small, localised, simple violations of law.

(IV) It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular fact, even in matters that concern us greatly.

Claim: We would need many many small, localised simple violations of law in order to secure a match of facts to the actual world after a counterfactual event than we would to secure a match of facts to the actual world before a counterfactual event.

E.g. Consider what the world will contain in the future with respect to the event of breaking an egg:

- the change in the particles in the air caused by the vibration of the egg striking the side of the pan
- the memory I have of the egg’s breaking.
- the various bits of egg shell that are projected in particular directions because of the exact way the egg struck the pan.
- the change in arrangement of the yolk and white in the shell because of the strike.
- the slight movement of the pan caused by the force of the egg on its edge.

Objection
Adam Elga (2001) argues that when one considers macroscopic thermodynamic processes carefully enough, it reveals that Lewis is wrong about the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence.

- Given the laws of thermodynamics, it is possible to secure convergence into the future without positing many violations of law.

CASE. Consider Gretta, at the actual world, who is about to crack an egg into a hot frying pan. The microphysical state of the world at $S_0$, in which Gretta is about to crack the egg, evolves into $S_1$, in which the egg is cooked and sitting on the pan. From this we can define the following process:

- The $S_0$-to-$S_1$ process: The egg oozes out of the cracked shell and drops down towards the pan, where it splats on the pan, making a noise, slightly heating up the surrounding air, and setting up some vibrations in the pan. Then the egg cooks by absorbing heat from the pan.

Call $Z_1$ the “velocity-reverse of $S_1”$ (318, original emphasis). In $Z_1$, all of the particles are just like those in $S_1$ except each one’s velocity is reversed such that, when you evolve $Z_1$ into the future it evolves in the way that $S_1$ would if you evolved it backwards. This results in the state $Z_0$, which is just like $S_0$ except the velocities of the particles are reversed. From this we can define the process:

- The $Z_1$-to-$Z_0$ process: The cooked egg uncooks by giving up heat to the (already very hot) pan. Meanwhile, molecules in the pan start to co-ordinate to form a pattern of vibration converging on the center of the pan. Air molecules around the room begin to form a series of spherical waves that converge on the pan. Just as the egg finishes uncooking, the coordinated action of these inward-directed air waves and pan vibrations congeals the egg into a round shape and propels it vertically towards the waiting open shell, which then seals around it.

NB: Both scenarios respect our dynamical laws.

Call ‘COOKED’ the “set of states that are exactly like $Z_1$ with respect to coarse-grained macroscopic parameters (such as temperature and pressure distribution)” (319). COOKED is what we call multiply realisable. There are multiple different microscopic states that can realise the macroscopic state.

Some of the states in COOKED have normal futures. They have futures like we’d expect them to have—e.g. wherein the egg sits in the pan and cools over time.
Other states in COOKED, though have abnormal futures. They have futures like \( Z_0 \), wherein the egg uncooks, comes together, and leaps back into the shell. There are many more normal futures than abnormal ones.

The \( Z_1 \) process is very “fragile” – i.e. any small change to \( Z_1 \) would have the result that it likely didn’t evolve into \( Z_0 \).

By analogy, think about it in terms of paths between two locations. Suppose you’re trying to get from A to B. If there is only one very narrow path from A to B, and your starting position at A is changed ever-so-slightly, you’ll miss the path and fail to reach B. On the other hand, if there is an absolutely massive path from A to B, a small change in your starting position won’t bump you off the path. It would be much harder to bump you off such a path.

But if this is so of \( Z_1 \), then it is also true of \( Z_2 \), since \( Z_1 \) was just like \( Z_1 \) except for the directions of the particles.

In other words, we could insert a small miracle at a world that is different from the actual one until a time just after when Gretta actually cracked an egg, and then that world could converge with the actual world. No large (or set of many) violations of law required.

3. **The Arrow of Entropy (A Fourth Arrow?)**
   (For those who also attended the Time lectures, the account here will be familiar.)

The combination of the thermodynamic laws and the Past Hypothesis (the hypothesis that there is a point of very low entropy in the very distant past) combine to yield the result that macro-physical processes evolve from past to future.

Thus, the asymmetry of counterfactuals holds because, at the macroscopic level, the Past Hypothesis and the Laws ensure that “small, local changes [...] produce much bigger and more diverse changes in the future than they do in the past” (Price and Weslake 2010: 424). And this explains the time-asymmetry of causation.

**Objection**

**Problem:** Positing a Past Hypothesis does not guarantee that all causes will be time-asymmetric in the way that we expect them to be.

**Metaphysica Objection:** This view allows for the possibility that, at some points in spacetime, all (or most) causal relations operate in the opposite temporal direction, and at other points in spacetime, causation reverses direction.

Subjectivist Objection: From Price and Weslake - whatever explains the time-asymmetry of causation should also be able to explain the time-asymmetry of deliberation. If this is right, then the entropy-based explanation fails.

Price and Weslake argue that if it were the case that either a local or a global increase in entropy towards the future explains the time-asymmetry of causation and of deliberation, it should also be the case that, if entropy increased towards the past, we would deliberate now to affect past events instead.

But it is not the case that future constraints stop us being able to being able to exercise control over the future. Here are Price and Weslake in their own words:

The first question is whether such a future constraint would imply that our deliberative phenomenology would be a future-directed analogue of what we are trying to explain with respect to the past: the sheer apparent absurdity, at least in ordinary cases, of acting so as to influence the past. It is hard to see why this should be so. Restrictions in the distant future—even extreme restrictions, much tighter than PH itself—seem to have virtually no bearing on our present sense that we can affect the future. Suppose God tells us that as a matter of law, the final state, some fifteen billion years from now, will be constrained within some tiny region of phase space (comparable in size to that required by PH). [...] Do we lapse into fatalism, coming to think it absurd that we might seek to influence our immediate future? It is hard to see why we would, or should. Hence, by symmetry, it is hard to see why a remote past hypothesis should be incompatible with taking ourselves to be able to affect the near past. (425, my emphasis)

To illustrate this on a smaller scale, the authors present a variation on the Death in Damascus case from decision theory.

[...] suppose we believe that we are destined to meet Death at noon on a certain day. [...] It is now 09:05 on the fateful morning, and we sit in Aleppo airport, with a boarding pass for the flight to Damascus. We know that Death will meet us in one place or other; and moreover (since he refuses to fly) that he is already on the road to whichever place it is to be. Is it absurd to think that we are still free to choose whether to board the plane? On the contrary, apparently. While the boundary condition certainly deprivus us of many options—the
option to be anywhere other than Damascus or Aleppo at noon, for example, or to be anywhere at all, later in the day—it also yields some new abilities: in particular, the ability to influence Death's movements, even somewhat earlier on the day in question. (425-6, my emphasis)

From this they argue that, when there is a future constraint (like our destined appointment with Death), we can affect the future in limited respects, and this can even result in our affecting the past in some respects.

These two points suggest the following, according to Price and Weslake:

- A point of low-entropy in the future—a future constraint—would not have the result of inclining us to fatalism. Whereas, we think that it is absurd to consider acting to change the past. This suggests that it is not the Past Hypothesis that is generating this sense of absurdity, since an analogous condition in the future produces no such sense.

4. The Arrow of Deliberation

Price and Weslake argue that we should understand the asymmetry of causation in terms of the asymmetry of deliberation.

We are "agents for whom actions follow deliberation" (434).

From this perspective, the future of events on which we deliberate is asymmetric to the past of those events, since in the past our deliberation lies, and in the future it does not.

If A is a cause of B just in case an agent's credence in B given that they bring about A is great than their unconditional credence in B, and if considering A to be a potential action (i.e. deliberating about A) involves imposing our perspective (i.e that perspective such that deliberations are in the past relative to actions), then causes will be considered to be prior to their effects from our perspective.

This explanation is meant to have the advantages that it does not make causation time-asymmetric by fiat, it explains why a number of different asymmetries 'line up' in the same direction, and it doesn't face the objections that faced the previous two strategies.